Handgun waiting periods reduce gun deaths by Luca, Michael et al.
Handgun waiting periods
reduce gun deaths
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Luca, Michael, Deepak Malhotra, and Christopher Poliquin. 2017.
“Handgun Waiting Periods Reduce Gun Deaths.” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 114 (46) (October 16): 12162–12165.
doi:10.1073/pnas.1619896114.
Published Version doi:10.1073/pnas.1619896114
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:34372583
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP
1 
Handgun Waiting Periods Reduce Gun Deaths 
Michael Luca1*, Deepak Malhotra1, Christopher Poliquin1 
 
August 2017 
SOCIAL SCIENCES: Social Sciences 
 
 
Author Affiliations 
1Harvard Business School, Soldiers Field Road, Boston, MA 02163, United States. 
*Correspondence to:  Michael Luca, Harvard Business School, Soldiers Field Road, Boston, MA 
02163, United States. Telephone: (617) 495-6000. Email: mluca@hbs.edu. 
 
 
Keywords 
gun policy | gun violence | waiting period | injury prevention 
 
  
2 
 
Abstract 
Handgun waiting periods are laws that impose a delay between the initiation of a purchase and 
final acquisition of a firearm. We show that waiting periods, which create a “cooling off” period 
among buyers, significantly reduce the incidence of gun violence. We estimate the impact of 
waiting periods on gun deaths, exploiting all changes to state-level policies in the Unites States 
since 1970. We find that waiting periods reduce gun homicides by roughly 17%. We provide 
further support for the causal impact of waiting periods on homicides by exploiting a natural 
experiment resulting from a federal law in 1994 that imposed a temporary waiting period on a 
subset of states. 
 
Significance Statement 
Waiting-period laws that delay the purchase of firearms by a few days reduce gun homicides by 
roughly 17%. Our results imply that the 17 states (including D.C.) with waiting periods avoid 
roughly 750 gun homicides per year as a result of this policy. Expanding the waiting-period 
policy to all other U.S. states would prevent an additional 910 gun homicides per year without 
imposing any restrictions on who can own a gun. 
 
 
/body  
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Introduction 
More than 33,000 people die in gun-related incidents each year in the United States, 
accounting for as many deaths as motor vehicle accidents (1). This is concerning both in absolute 
terms, and in comparison to other developed countries—all of which have lower rates of gun 
violence (2). For example, if the U.S. could lower its firearm death rate to that of Finland (the 
high-income country with the second highest rate), roughly 20,000 fewer people would die from 
guns every year. Yet, there has been no meaningful reduction in the United States firearm-related 
death rate for more than a decade. Moreover, evidence about which policies would be effective 
at reducing violence remains limited (3) and the types of bills that are enacted depend on the 
political party in power (4). 
One avenue for reducing gun deaths is to draw on insights from behavioral economics 
and psychology, which suggest that delaying gun purchases—even for a short time—might be an 
effective policy tool. Visceral factors such as anger or suicidal impulses can spur people to inflict 
harm on others or themselves, but tend to be transitory states (5, 6). For example, Card and Dahl 
(7) find that there is a 10% increase in domestic violence following an upset loss of the local 
NFL football team. Moreover, behaviors triggered by such visceral states can be contrary to 
longer-term self-interest (5, 6). 
Delaying a gun purchase could create a “cooling off” period that reduces violence by 
postponing firearm acquisitions until after a visceral state has passed. Increasing the time it takes 
to acquire a gun might also close the window of opportunity for would-be perpetrators of 
violence to use their weapons. Finally, a mandatory delay has the potential to deter purchases 
among people who have malevolent, but temporary, motivations for owning a firearm. 
This paper explores the impact of “waiting period” laws on firearm-related homicides and 
suicides using forty-five years of data on law changes and mortality at the state level in the 
United States. A waiting period is a mandatory delay between the purchase and delivery of a 
gun; it requires purchasers to wait—typically between 2 and 7 days—before receiving their 
weapons. We exploit plausibly exogenous temporal and geographic variation in waiting period 
laws to implement a difference-in-differences approach that identifies the causal impact of 
waiting periods on homicides and suicides. 
We find that waiting periods cause large and statistically significant reductions in 
homicides. Point estimates using our full, forty-five-year sample and all waiting period changes 
imply a 17% reduction in gun homicides.  We provide further evidence of a causal relationship 
between waiting periods and lower homicide rates based on a natural experiment in which 
federal law imposed waiting periods on a subset of states. Estimates from this analysis also 
suggest that waiting periods reduce gun homicides by 17%.  The results of both analyses confirm 
a large and robust effect of waiting periods on homicides. We also find a negative effect of 
waiting periods on suicides, but the magnitude and statistical significance of the suicide effect 
varies across model specification. 
 
Data and Research Design 
We construct a panel of every change to waiting period laws in the United States between 
1970 and 2014, which we obtained from state statutes and session laws. We combine these 
changes with annual data on firearm-related deaths from the Centers for Disease Control and 
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Prevention. Figure 1 shows the number of states with waiting periods over time. Overall, 44 
states (including D.C.) have had a waiting period for at least some time between 1970 and 2014. 
Exploiting the significant geographic and temporal variation in the adoption of waiting periods, 
we implement a difference-in-differences framework to estimate the causal impact of waiting 
periods on gun deaths. Essentially, we compare changes in firearm-related deaths within states 
that adopted waiting periods to changes in firearm-related deaths in other states. We control for 
changing economic, demographic, and political factors that may be correlated with higher levels 
of gun violence or with the decision of lawmakers to adopt policies that delay gun purchases. 
To support our causal interpretation, we then restrict the analysis to the period from 1990 
to 1998, during which federal policy forced many states to implement waiting periods. The 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (hereinafter “Brady Act”)—which went into effect in 
February 1994—required background checks on handgun purchases from licensed firearm 
dealers, and created a 5-day waiting period to allow sufficient time for the check. Although it 
was a federal policy, the Brady Act only created new waiting periods for 19 states, since some 
states already required a background check and waiting period, and some implemented an 
“instant check” system that allowed for nearly immediate background checks (thereby obviating 
the need for a waiting period). We provide further details regarding the Brady Act and affected 
states in the supplementary materials and the Materials and Methods section. 
  
Results 
We begin by examining the effect of waiting periods across the full sample period from 
1970 to 2014. The results of table 1 show that waiting periods are associated with a 17% 
reduction in gun homicides. This effect is equivalent to approximately 36 fewer gun homicides 
per year for a state with an average number of gun deaths. Waiting periods also lead to a 7–11% 
reduction in gun suicides (depending on the control variables used in the specification), which is 
equivalent to 22–35 fewer gun suicides per year for the average state. The results in table 1 use a 
log-linear specification; we present models with state-specific trends, models linear in the rate of 
violence, and Poisson models as part of the supplementary information (tables S3 and S5). The 
conclusion that waiting periods reduce gun homicides is robust across all specifications. The 
conclusion regarding suicides is robust to all specifications except those that include state-
specific, linear trends (table S3). Both conclusions are robust across models with and without 
controls for state-level economic and demographic changes. 
To further support the hypothesis that waiting periods lead to a reduction in gun 
homicides, we then focus on a natural experiment created by the Brady Act—a federal law that 
forced some states to adopt new waiting period and background check policies between 1994 and 
1998. Ludwig and Cook (8) also use the Brady Act to study whether background checks 
and waiting periods affect violence. They compare “Brady states” that were subject to the Brady 
Act with “Brady exempt” states that were not. However, some states that were classified as 
“Brady states” already had waiting periods and background checks prior to the Brady Act, and 
other states chose to implement an “instant” background check system instead of requiring a 
waiting period. As a result, the coding of “Brady states” in Ludwig and Cook fails to capture all 
states that had pre-existing waiting periods. In contrast, we precisely code which states had 
waiting periods (prior to 1994), and which implemented waiting periods only because of the 
Brady Act. In total, our coding differs from theirs for 16 states. This additional accuracy allows 
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us to assess the causal impact of waiting periods resulting from the Brady Act. The full list of 
differences between our coding and prior research, along with supporting citations, can be found 
in the online supplementary information (table S2). 
We find that waiting periods lead to large and statistically significant reductions in gun 
violence (table 2) during the Brady interim period. Specifically, the results of column 3 show 
that waiting periods implemented during the Brady interim years resulted in a 17% reduction in 
gun homicides. This is equivalent to roughly 39 fewer homicides per year for the average state.  
There was also a 6% reduction in gun suicides (i.e., 17 fewer suicides per year for the average 
state). Both results are robust across models with and without controls for state-level economic 
and demographic changes. Notably, exploiting the Brady Act as a natural experiment produces 
similar estimates as the longer sample period from 1970 to 2014. 
Tables 1 and 2 also show that waiting periods have no significant effect on non-gun 
homicides, suggesting that people subject to waiting period laws do not substitute to other means 
of committing homicide. This is consistent with other research (9) finding no increase in non-gun 
homicides in response to policies restricting access to firearms. Results for non-gun suicides, 
however, are less clear; some specifications suggest partial substitution towards non-gun 
methods of suicide in response to handgun waiting periods. 
 
Discussion 
Our results show that waiting periods reduce gun homicides. Waiting periods for gun 
purchases are not only supported by the American Medical Association, but also by a majority of 
Americans and a majority of gun owners (10, 11). Our point estimates, based on forty-five years 
of data, suggest that the 17 states (including D.C.) with waiting periods as of 2014 avoid 
approximately 750 gun homicides. Expanding the waiting-period policy to states that do not 
currently have it would prevent an additional 910 gun homicides per year. Waiting periods 
would therefore reduce gun violence without imposing any restrictions on who can own a gun. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Our main specifications are of the form: 
 𝑟"# = 	𝛼" + 𝜆# + 𝛽𝑊"# + 𝛾𝐵"# + 𝛿′𝑋"# + 𝜖"# 
 
where 𝑟"# is the natural logarithm of the rate of violence (homicides or suicides) per 
100,000 adult residents, 𝑊"# is an indicator for handgun waiting periods and 𝐵"# is an indicator 
for whether background checks are required for dealer handgun sales. We include an indicator 
variable for background checks on handgun purchases from licensed firearm dealers because a 
major source of policy variation in our dataset (the Brady Act) also affected background check 
policies. As seen in tables 1 and 2, the estimated impact of background checks depends on model 
specification. We also incorporate time varying, state level control variables that may also 
influence rates of gun violence (8), 𝑋"#, including alcohol consumption, poverty, income, 
urbanization, black population, and seven age groups. Summary statistics for these variables are 
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included in the supplementary information available online (table S1). The 𝛼" and 𝜆# parameters 
represent state and year fixed effects. These fixed effects control for stable, state-specific factors 
affecting violence and time-varying factors that affect all states identically. It is impossible to 
control for all time-varying, state-specific factors that affect gun violence. For example, policing 
tactics, drug use, and environmental factors such as lead exposure might not have changed 
uniformly across states over time and may also affect violence. However, the consistency 
between our estimates during the short (Brady interim) period and the longer period (including 
all waiting period changes since 1970) supports our interpretation of the results. The model 
parameters are estimated via least squares weighted by state population. We then calculate the 
percentage effect of waiting periods on violence using the estimator described by Kennedy (12). 
We code a state as having a waiting period if it imposes any mandatory delay on the 
purchase of a handgun or has a permitting system for dealer and private sales.* Currently, 10 
states and the District of Columbia impose an explicit waiting period on handgun sales, and an 
additional 5 states have permitting systems for private and dealer sales that result in a delay of 
firearm purchases. Forty-four states have had a handgun waiting period at some point since 1970, 
although 19 implemented the policy only due to the Brady Act’s interim provisions—in effect 
from February 1994 to November 1998. These provisions required local law enforcement 
agencies to conduct background checks on handgun purchases from licensed firearm dealers and 
required a 5-day waiting period to conduct the check. Some states already required background 
checks and/or waiting periods prior to the Brady Act and were therefore not affected by the new 
law, but other states were forced to adopt a new waiting period due to the federal policy change. 
When the permanent provisions of the Brady Act took effect on November 30, 1998, the federal 
waiting period requirement was replaced with an instant background check system (the National 
Instant Criminal Background Check System; NICS). As a result, many states discarded their 
waiting periods after 1998 because NICS eliminated the need for a waiting period to investigate 
purchasers’ backgrounds. We use the subset of waiting period changes that resulted from the 
Brady Act as a natural experiment to provide further support for our analysis of the full sample 
period from 1970 to 2014. 
Although 9 states have also had a waiting period on long-guns (i.e. rifles and shotguns) 
sometime since 1970, we focus on handgun waiting periods because handguns account for 70–
80% of firearm homicides (13) and because a major source of variation in our data—the Brady 
Act’s interim period—only affected handgun sales. 
  
                                                
* In the supplement, we estimate models with a separate control variable for handgun permit systems and show that 
the effect of waiting periods is not limited to states with permitting systems. 
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Fig. 1. States with handgun waiting periods and background checks on dealer sales from 1970 to 
2015. Many states were required to implement these policies during the Brady interim period 
between February 1994 and November 1998 (shaded gray). Following prior research (8), 
Alabama and Ohio are coded as not requiring background checks after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Printz v. United States. Not all states had waiting periods during the Brady interim 
period because they implemented or already had an instant background check system that 
obviated the need for a waiting period to investigate gun buyers. 
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Supplementary Information 
 
Handgun Waiting Periods Reduce Gun Deaths 
 
M. Luca, D. Malhotra, C. Poliquin 
 
Summary Statistics 
Table S1 provides summary statistics for variables used in the main analyses. Panel A 
shows summary statistics for variables used for analyses presented in table 1 of the article, 
covering the full 1970–2014 sample period. Panel B shows summary statistics for variables used 
for the analysis of the Brady interim period in table 2, covering 1990–1998. 
Identifying Policy Changes 
In our first set of analyses, covering 1970–2014, we extend prior coding of policy changes 
by including an additional 36 years of data with 25 changes in waiting period policies. Our 
approach to identifying changes in waiting period policies also improves on Ludwig and 
Cook’s (8) classification of states affected by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. Prior 
research coded all states subject to the Brady Act’s interim provisions as treatment states, but 
some of these states already had background checks and/or waiting periods prior to the interim 
period. Table S2 details the differences between our coding and that of Ludwig and Cook (8). In 
total, our coding differs for 16 states; the table footnotes provide supporting citations for each 
difference. We find that these improvements more accurately measure the effects of waiting 
periods on homicides, which we now find to be robust and statistically significant at 
conventional levels—even when we restrict the sample to the same years examined in prior 
research. 
Robustness: State Specific Trends 
If states that do and do not adopt waiting periods have different trends in violence prior to 
the implementation of the waiting period, then one might be concerned that our results reflect 
these different trends, rather than the impact of the waiting period policy. To allow for the 
possibility of differential secular trends, table S3 estimates a log-linear model with linear trends 
that vary by state for the 1970–2014 time period.* This model produces similar estimates for the 
effect of waiting periods on homicides, suggesting that differential trends are not the main driver 
of the results and providing further support for our interpretation. The results for suicides, 
however, differ across specification and are not robust to the inclusion of control variables and 
state-specific trends in suicide. The model without trends in column 3 of table 1 suggests that 
waiting periods reduce gun suicides by 7%, while the model in column 3 of table S3 suggests no 
reduction. The results of table S3 also suggest that any decrease in gun suicides due to waiting 
periods is offset by an increase in non-gun suicides. 
                                                
* We do not estimate models with state-specific trends for the analysis of the Brady interim period (1990–1998) 
because there is too little pre-treatment data to identify pre-existing, state-specific trends in gun violence (14). 
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Robustness: Falsification Exercise and Dynamic Effects 
To shed further light on the dynamics of the effects shown in table 1, table S4 re-estimates 
the model in column 3 of table 1 but includes leads and lags of the policy change—specifically, 
including indicator variables for the years before and after implementation of a waiting period. 
We find that the impact of waiting periods does not appear until the waiting period has been 
adopted, providing further support for our causal interpretation. Violence appears to fall soon 
after implementation, although the single-year estimates are imprecise. 
Robustness: Other Changes in Gun Policy 
While the results overall point to the causal effect of waiting periods, one might still 
be concerned that other gun policy changes are correlated with the timing of waiting period 
changes. To address this concern, we provide evidence that the effects reported in table 1 are 
robust to the inclusion of controls for other gun policies in a state. Specifically, in table S5, we 
re-estimate the models of columns 2 and 3 in table 1, but include additional variables for 
handgun permit and concealed carry policies to account for potential correlation between the 
implementation of these policies and waiting periods. The results in table S5 show that the 
inclusion of other gun policies in the model does not change our conclusion that waiting periods 
reduce gun homicides and suicides. Our study uses a natural experiment embedded in the Brady 
Act to identify the impact of waiting periods; estimating the causal impact of exogenous changes 
to other gun policies is beyond the scope of this paper. Other research focuses on the impact of 
handgun permits (15, 16) and concealed carry laws (17, 18, 19, 20). 
Alternative Model Specifications 
Alternative specifications for the effect of waiting periods on homicides and suicides 
produce similar point estimates (table S6). The estimates in panel A are based on models linear 
in the rate of violence. The results in columns 2 and 3 imply that waiting periods reduce gun 
homicides by roughly 18% and gun suicides by 5–9% for a state with an average rate of 
violence. Results for the Poisson model (panel B) imply reductions of 18–20% and 7–11.6% for 
gun homicides and suicides respectively, while estimates based on the log-linear model 
presented in the main text and table 1 imply 17% and 7–11% reductions. 
Additionally, we examine unweighted, least-squares estimates (table S7). The coefficient 
estimates on the waiting period dummy from the unweighted regressions are attenuated relative 
to the weighted results. This suggests that the effect of waiting period policies is heterogeneous, 
with larger states experiencing greater reductions in violence than smaller states (21). To ensure 
our results are not driven by outlier states, we re-estimate the model of gun homicide and suicide 
rates (column 3 of table 1), but exclude one state at a time. Figure S1 shows the 51 resulting 
coefficients (one from excluding each state and D.C.) for homicides and suicides. The coefficient 
estimates are consistently negative. As expected from the difference between the weighted and 
unweighted estimates, large states like Pennsylvania and Florida seem to exert downward 
pressure on the coefficient. 
Complete Coefficient Estimates 
Table S8 presents coefficient estimates for all variables included in model 3 of table 1. This 
model uses the same control variables as prior research by Ludwig and Cook (8).  
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Fig. S1. Estimates of the effect of waiting periods on gun homicides and suicides, dropping each 
state individually from the analysis and re-estimating model 3 of table 1. Bars are 1.96 ± the 
standard error of the waiting period coefficient. Solid lines mark the full sample estimates; 
dashed lines are 1.96 ± the full sample standard error. 
 
Table 1. 
Effects of handgun waiting periods and background checks on violence, 1970–2014. Coefficients 
represent the effects of waiting periods and background checks on the natural logarithm of deaths 
per 100,000 adult residents. All models include state and year fixed effects. Models 1–2 include 
only the policy variables shown. Model 3 follows the specification of Ludwig and Cook and 
includes alcohol consumption, poverty, income, urbanization, black population, and seven age 
groups. Model 3 uses fewer years of data due to missing control variables in earlier years. The 
1970–2014 period includes 2,295 state-year observations; the model for gun homicides omits 
three state-years and the model for non-gun homicides omits two state years because the death 
count was zero and the model is specified with a logged dependent variable.1 Similarly, the 
1977–2014 period includes 1,938 state-years, but omits two state-years for gun homicides and 
one state-year for non-gun homicides.1 Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. 
 
	 1970–2014	 1977–2014	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
All	Homicide	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Waiting	Period	 -0.127	(0.059)**	 -0.137	(0.059)**	 -0.132	(0.050)**	
Background	Check	 				 0.049	(0.082)	 0.025	(0.081)	
Gun	Homicide	 				 				 				
Waiting	Period	 -0.188	(0.077)**	 -0.187	(0.086)**	 -0.186	(0.071)**	
Background	Check	 				 -0.004	(0.103)	 0.022	(0.107)	
Non-Gun	Homicide	 				 				 				
Waiting	Period	 -0.016	(0.051)	 -0.048	(0.060)	 -0.035	(0.037)	
Background	Check	 				 0.153	(0.076)**	 0.036	(0.057)	
All	Suicide	 				 				 				
Waiting	Period	 -0.047	(0.021)**	 -0.070	(0.023)***	 -0.024	(0.011)**	
Background	Check	 				 0.113	(0.061)*	 0.023	(0.020)	
Gun	Suicide	 				 				 				
Waiting	Period	 -0.097	(0.034)***	 -0.120	(0.031)***	 -0.074	(0.017)***	
Background	Check	 				 0.111	(0.073)	 0.029	(0.028)	
Non-Gun	Suicide	 				 				 				
Waiting	Period	 -0.017	(0.038)	 -0.058	(0.059)	 -0.006	(0.033)	
Background	Check	 				 0.199	(0.072)***	 0.084	(0.031)**	
*	p	<	.10,	**	p	<	.05,	***	p	<	.01	
	
                                                
1 North Dakota had no gun homicides in 1972 and 2008 and no non-gun homicides in 2003. Vermont had no gun 
homicides in 2009 and no non-gun homicides in 1970. Alternative model specifications presented in the 
supplementary materials (table S6) are not logged and include all state-years. 
Table 2. 
Effects of handgun waiting periods and background checks on violence, 1990-1998. Coefficients 
represent the effects of waiting periods and background checks on the natural logarithm of deaths 
per 100,000 adult residents. All models include state and year fixed effects. Models 1–2 include 
only the policy variables shown. Model 3 follows the specification of Ludwig and Cook and 
includes alcohol consumption, poverty, income, urbanization, black population, and seven age 
groups. The sample includes 459 state-year observations for all models. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by state. 
 
	 Brady	Period,	1990-1998	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
All	Homicide	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Waiting	Period	 -0.073	(0.084)	 -0.130	(0.077)*	 -0.145	(0.060)**	
Background	Check	 		 0.091	(0.064)	 0.010	(0.053)	
Gun	Homicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.103	(0.093)	 -0.179	(0.087)**	 -0.181	(0.068)**	
Background	Check	 		 0.120	(0.080)	 0.033	(0.065)	
Non-Gun	Homicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.019	(0.068)	 -0.035	(0.064)	 -0.072	(0.050)	
Background	Check	 		 0.025	(0.044)	 -0.043	(0.039)	
All	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.016	(0.021)	 -0.022	(0.023)	 -0.036	(0.020)*	
Background	Check	 		 0.009	(0.022)	 -0.007	(0.019)	
Gun	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.039	(0.024)	 -0.053	(0.028)*	 -0.066	(0.021)***	
Background	Check	 		 0.023	(0.028)	 -0.003	(0.024)	
Non-Gun	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 0.050	(0.021)**	 0.035	(0.022)	 0.018	(0.022)	
Background	Check	 		 0.024	(0.023)	 0.009	(0.018)	
*	p	<	.10,	**	p	<	.05,	***	p	<	.01	
	
Table S1. 
State-level summary statistics. Homicide and suicide rates are adult (21+) deaths per 100,000 
adult residents. Alcohol consumption is measured in gallons of ethanol per capita; income is 
thousands of 1998 dollars. Demographic control variables are percentages of total state 
population. Panel A shows summary statistics for the models in table 1; Panel B shows statistics 
for the models in table 2. 
 
A. Summary Statistics (Table 1) 
	 mean	 sd	 p5	 p10	 p50	 p90	 p95	
Years	1970–2014	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Gun	homicide	rate	 5.7	 4.9	 1.0	 1.4	 4.4	 11.1	 14.4	
Homicide	rate	 8.5	 6.7	 2.1	 2.6	 6.8	 15.6	 19.4	
Gun	suicide	rate	 10.2	 4.2	 3.1	 4.0	 10.2	 15.0	 17.1	
Suicide	rate	 17.3	 4.7	 10.2	 11.9	 16.7	 23.7	 26.0	
Handgun	waiting	period	 0.45	 0.49	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1	
Background	checks	 0.64	 0.48	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1	
Years	1977–2014	(Control	Variables	for	Model	3)	
Alcohol	consumption	 2.9	 0.8	 2.0	 2.1	 2.7	 3.8	 4.3	
Income	per	capita	 25.4	 5.8	 17.2	 18.6	 24.8	 32.6	 35.7	
Demographics	(%)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Poverty	 5.7	 4.9	 1.0	 1.4	 4.4	 11.1	 14.4	
Urban	areas	 8.5	 6.7	 2.1	 2.6	 6.8	 15.6	 19.4	
Black	 10.2	 4.2	 3.1	 4.0	 10.2	 15.0	 17.1	
Ages	0	to	14	 17.3	 4.7	 10.2	 11.9	 16.7	 23.7	 26.0	
Ages	15	to	17	 0.45	 0.49	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1	
Ages	18	to	24	 0.64	 0.48	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1	
Ages	25	to	34	 2.9	 0.8	 2.0	 2.1	 2.7	 3.8	 4.3	
Ages	35	to	44	 25.4	 5.8	 17.2	 18.6	 24.8	 32.6	 35.7	
Ages	45	to	54	 5.7	 4.9	 1.0	 1.4	 4.4	 11.1	 14.4	
Ages	55	to	64	 8.5	 6.7	 2.1	 2.6	 6.8	 15.6	 19.4	
 
  
B. Summary Statistics, 1990–1998 (Models 1–3 of Table 2) 
	 mean	 sd	 p5	 p10	 p50	 p90	 p95	
Gun	homicide	rate	 5.9	 6.1	 1.0	 1.4	 4.6	 10.4	 12.3	
Homicide	rate	 8.8	 8.0	 2.1	 2.7	 7.0	 14.7	 18.3	
Gun	suicide	rate	 10.2	 4.0	 3.2	 4.0	 10.6	 15.0	 17.3	
Suicide	rate	 16.6	 4.5	 9.6	 11.4	 16.1	 22.7	 24.9	
Handgun	waiting	period	 0.63	 0.47	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1	
Background	checks	 0.74	 0.43	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1	
Alcohol	consumption	 2.6	 0.6	 2.0	 2.1	 2.6	 3.1	 4.1	
Income	per	capita	 24.3	 3.8	 19.1	 19.9	 23.9	 29.1	 31.7	
Demographics	(%)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Poverty	 13.3	 4.0	 8.2	 8.9	 12.5	 19.0	 21.1	
Urban	areas	 63.5	 19.9	 29.0	 35.1	 63.9	 87.5	 91.1	
Black	 11.1	 12.0	 0.4	 0.5	 7.3	 27.5	 31.9	
Ages	0	to	14	 21.9	 1.9	 19.4	 20.0	 21.6	 24.1	 25.2	
Ages	15	to	17	 4.3	 0.5	 3.5	 3.7	 4.2	 4.9	 5.1	
Ages	18	to	24	 9.9	 0.9	 8.4	 8.9	 9.9	 11.0	 11.6	
Ages	25	to	34	 15.7	 1.6	 13.1	 13.7	 15.6	 17.7	 18.4	
Ages	35	to	44	 16.0	 1.0	 14.4	 14.8	 15.9	 17.1	 17.7	
Ages	45	to	54	 11.5	 1.2	 9.7	 10.0	 11.5	 13.1	 13.5	
Ages	55	to	64	 8.2	 0.7	 7.1	 7.5	 8.2	 8.9	 9.1	
 
Table S2. 
States that implemented background checks and waiting periods during the Brady Act’s interim 
period from February 1994 through November 1998, according to Ludwig and Cook (8) and this 
paper. The coding of states in boldface differs; see table endnotes for an explanation of 
differences. Dates are noted for cases in which policies changed during the interim period. 
Legend	
■ State	got	policy	for	full	interim	period	
□ State	got	policy	for	part	of	interim	period	
 
 Ludwig & Cook (2000) New Coding (This Paper) 
State Background Check 
Waiting 
Period 
Background 
Check 
Waiting 
Period 
Alabama1 ■ ■ ■  
Alaska ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Arizona2 ■ ■ ■ □ Feb-Oct 1994 
Arkansas □ □ □ Feb '94-June '97 
□ 
Feb '94-June '97 
California     
Colorado ■  ■  
Connecticut     
Delaware     
District of Columbia     
Florida     
Georgia3 ■ ■ ■ □ Feb '94-Dec '95 
Hawaii     
Idaho4 ■ ■ ■ □ Feb-May 1994 
Illinois     
Indiana     
Iowa     
Kansas ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Kentucky ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Louisiana ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Maine ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Maryland     
Massachusetts     
Michigan     
Minnesota5 ■    
Mississippi ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Missouri     
Montana ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Nebraska6 ■ ■   
Nevada7   ■  
New Hampshire8 ■ ■ ■ □ Feb-Dec 1994 
New Jersey     
New Mexico ■ ■ ■ ■ 
 Ludwig & Cook (2000) New Coding (This Paper) 
State Background Check 
Waiting 
Period 
Background 
Check 
Waiting 
Period 
New York     
North Carolina9 ■ ■   
North Dakota ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Ohio10 □ □ □ Feb '94-June '97 
 
Oklahoma ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Oregon     
Pennsylvania11 ■ ■ ■  
Rhode Island12 ■    
South Carolina13 ■ ■ ■  
South Dakota14 ■ ■ ■  
Tennessee15 ■ ■   
Texas ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Utah ■  ■  
Vermont ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Virginia     
Washington16 ■    
West Virginia ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Wisconsin     
Wyoming ■ ■ ■ ■ 
1	 Alabama	had	a	2-day	waiting	period	on	handgun	purchases	prior	to	implementation	of	the	Brady	Act;	see	Code	
of	Ala.	§	13A-11-77.	
2	 Arizona	created	an	instant	check	background	system	in	October	1994	and	therefore	had	effectively	no	waiting	
period	for	most	of	the	Brady	Act’s	interim	period;	see	Ariz.	Rev.	Stat.	Ann.	§	13–3114.	
3	 Georgia	implemented	an	instant	check	system	in	January	1996;	see	Ga.	Code	Ann.	§	16-11-170.	
4	 Idaho	implemented	an	instant	check	system	in	June	1994;	see	Ida.	Code	§	19-5403.	
5	 Minnesota	created	a	permit	system	in	1977	that	required	background	checks	and	a	seven-day	waiting	period	for	
handgun	purchases;	see	Minn.	Stat.	§	624.7131	et	seq.	
6	 Nebraska	was	exempt	from	the	Brady	Act	(22,	23).	Furthermore,	it	created	a	handgun	permit	system	with	a	
background	check	and	two-day	waiting	period	in	1991;	see	Neb.	Rev.	Stat.	§	69-2404	et	seq.	
7	 Ludwig	and	Cook	(8)	say	Nevada	was	classified	as	a	control	state	because	it’s	pre-Brady	Act	laws	were	strict	
enough	to	warrant	an	exemption	even	though	it	was	subject	to	the	Brady	Act.	We	cannot	find	evidence	of	this;	
Nevada	had	neither	a	background	check	nor	waiting	period	requirement	prior	to	implementation	of	the	Brady	
Act	(24)	and	was	subject	to	the	Act’s	provisions	(23).	We	classify	the	state	as	not	having	a	waiting	period	
because	the	state	implemented	an	instant	check	system	(25).	
8	 New	Hampshire	implemented	an	instant	check	system	in	January	1995;	see	N.H.	Rev.	Stat	Ann.	§	159-C.	
9	 We	classify	North	Carolina	as	a	control	state	because	it	implemented	a	handgun	permit	system	in	1919;	see	N.C.	
Gen.	Stat.	§	14-402	et	seq.	An	explicit	background	check	requirement	was	not	added	to	the	statutes	until	1995,	
but	the	law	previously	required	Superior	Court	clerks	to	certify	that	handgun	permit	applicants	were	of	"good	
moral	character"	and	included	felonies,	indictments,	fugitive	status,	and	mentally	ill	persons	among	those	not	of	
such	character;	see	N.C.	Gen.	Stat.	§	14-404.	
10	Ohio	was	subject	to	the	Brady	Act’s	interim	provisions	(22,	23)	but	had	instant	background	checks	(25)	and	is	
therefore	coded	as	not	implementing	a	waiting	period.	Like	Ludwig	and	Cook	(8),	we	code	Ohio	as	stopping	
background	checks	after	the	Supreme	Court’s	decision	in	Printz	v.	United	States	in	June	of	1997.	We	cannot	find	
a	statute	or	executive	order	for	Ohio,	and	therefore	rely	exclusively	on	federal	government	reports	(22,	23,	25).	
11	Pennsylvania	already	had	a	two-day	waiting	period	prior	to	implementation	of	the	Brady	Act	(24).	We	therefore	
code	the	state	as	only	implementing	the	Brady	Act’s	background	check	provisions.	The	state	abandoned	its	
waiting	period	in	1998	when	instant	checks	became	available;	see	text	and	legislative	history	of	18	Pa.C.S.A.	
§	6111.	
12	Rhode	Island	was	subject	to	the	Brady	Act	despite	requiring	both	a	background	check	and	waiting	period	as	part	
of	its	handgun	permit	process	prior	to	1994	(24).	It	therefore	did	not	newly	implement	background	checks	or	
waiting	periods	as	a	result	of	the	Brady	Act;	see	R.I.	Gen.	Laws	§	11-47-35	et	seq.	
13	South	Carolina's	Law	Enforcement	Division	(SLED)	ran	an	instant	check	system	at	the	time	the	Brady	Act	was	
implemented	(22,	25,	26)	and	is	therefore	coded	as	not	implementing	a	waiting	period.	South	Carolina’s	
governor	created	the	instant	check	system	by	executive	order	(26).	
14	South	Dakota	had	a	two-day	waiting	period	prior	to	implementation	of	the	Brady	Act	(since	at	least	1935)	that	
was	not	repealed	until	2009;	see	S.D.	Codified	Laws	§	23-7-9.	
15	Tennessee	was	subject	to	the	Brady	Act	even	though	it	already	required	a	background	check	and	fifteen-day	
waiting	period	(24);	see	Tenn.	Code	Ann.	§	39-17-1316.	It	is	therefore	coded	as	not	newly	implementing	these	
laws	due	to	the	Brady	Act’s	interim	provisions.	
16	Washington	had	background	checks	before	the	Brady	Act	but	was	not	Brady	exempt	because	it	did	not	require	
the	chief	law	enforcement	officer	in	the	area	where	the	purchaser	lived	to	conduct	the	check.	See	Wash.	Rev.	
Code	Ann.	§	9.41.090.	
 
Table S3. 
Effects of handgun waiting periods and background checks on violence, including state-specific 
trends, 1970–2014. Coefficients represent the effects of waiting periods and background checks 
on the natural logarithm of deaths per 100,000 adult residents. Models mirror table 1, but include 
a state-specific, linear trend in addition to state and year fixed effects. Models 1–2 include only 
the policy variables shown. Model 3 follows the specification of Ludwig and Cook (8) and uses 
fewer years of data due to missing control variables in earlier years. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by state. 
 
	 1970–2014	 1977–2014	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
All	Homicide	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Waiting	Period	 -0.118	(0.049)**	 -0.129	(0.049)**	 -0.086	(0.045)*	
Background	Check	 		 0.033	(0.057)	 0.001	(0.047)	
Gun	Homicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.181	(0.066)***	 -0.195	(0.071)***	 -0.124	(0.050)**	
Background	Check	 		 0.043	(0.077)	 0.014	(0.068)	
Non-Gun	Homicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.011	(0.039)	 -0.014	(0.038)	 -0.030	(0.047)	
Background	Check	 		 0.011	(0.051)	 -0.015	(0.035)	
All	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 0.015	(0.013)	 0.017	(0.013)	 0.022	(0.016)	
Background	Check	 		 -0.005	(0.017)	 -0.006	(0.015)	
Gun	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.044	(0.017)**	 -0.045	(0.020)**	 -0.012	(0.016)	
Background	Check	 		 0.002	(0.018)	 -0.017	(0.017)	
Non-Gun	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 0.056	(0.019)***	 0.050	(0.020)**	 0.048	(0.024)*	
Background	Check	 		 0.020	(0.022)	 0.019	(0.024)	
*	p	<	.10,	**	p	<	.05,	***	p	<	.01	
Table S4. 
Effect of handgun waiting periods relative to adoption year, 1977-2013. Models mirror column 3 
of table 1, but include an indicator variable for years before and after implementation of the 
waiting period.  
 
	 Homicides	 Suicides	
Time	Relative	to All	 Gun	 Non-Gun	 All	 Gun	 Non-Gun	
Waiting	Period	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
2	Years	Before	 -0.024	(0.047)	 -0.038	(0.056)	 0.004	(0.060)	 0.015	(0.021)	 0.001	(0.024)	 0.045	(0.031)	
1	Year	Before	 -0.053	(0.051)	 -0.076	(0.060)	 -0.014	(0.052)	 0.025	(0.017)	 0.003	(0.018)	 0.046	(0.029)	
Adoption	Year	 -0.087	(0.054)	 -0.106	(0.077)	 -0.063	(0.051)	 0.008	(0.021)	 -0.014	(0.026)	 0.006	(0.034)	
1	Year	After	 -0.147	(0.060)**	 -0.178	(0.080)**	 -0.11	(0.065)*	 -0.032	(0.022)	 -0.082	(0.026)***	 -0.016	(0.032)	
2	Years	After	 -0.147	(0.058)**	 -0.176	(0.082)**	 -0.086	(0.043)*	 -0.004	(0.016)	 -0.061	(0.023)***	 0.039	(0.030)	
3	Years	After	 -0.145	(0.060)**	 -0.198	(0.083)**	 -0.048	(0.053)	 -0.007	(0.017)	 -0.063	(0.022)***	 0.04	(0.034)	
4+	Years	After	 -0.129	(0.053)**	 -0.188	(0.072)**	 -0.021	(0.041)	 -0.022	(0.012)*	 -0.071	(0.016)***	 -0.006	(0.037)	
*	p	<	.10,	**	p	<	.05,	***	p	<	.01	
 
Table S5. 
Estimates of the waiting period effect, controlling for other gun policies. Coefficients represent 
the effect of a policy on the natural logarithm of deaths per 100,000 adult residents. Models 
mirror those of table 1. Model 1 includes only the policy variables shown. Model 2 follows the 
specification of Ludwig and Cook (8) and uses fewer years of data due to missing control 
variables in earlier years. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. 
	
	 1970-2014	 1977-2014	
	 (1)	 (2)	
All	Homicide	 		 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.141	 (0.061)**	 -0.137	 (0.051)**	
Background	Check	 0.054	 (0.065)	 0.019	 (0.068)	
Handgun	Permit	 0.021	 (0.089)	 0.051	 (0.091)	
Shall-Issue	CCW	 0.002	 (0.104)	 0.056	 (0.095)	
May-Issue	CCW	 0.006	 (0.118)	 0.062	 (0.097)	
Gun	Homicide	 		 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.201	 (0.086)**	 -0.194	 (0.074)**	
Background	Check	 0.010	 (0.084)	 0.007	 (0.090)	
Handgun	Permit	 0.075	 (0.093)	 0.084	 (0.125)	
Shall-Issue	CCW	 -0.019	 (0.119)	 0.078	 (0.118)	
May-Issue	CCW	 -0.035	 (0.137)	 0.046	 (0.118)	
Non-Gun	Homicide	 		 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.033	 (0.055)	 -0.035	 (0.033)	
Background	Check	 0.135	 (0.055)**	 0.042	 (0.053)	
Handgun	Permit	 -0.077	 (0.100)	 0.006	 (0.054)	
Shall-Issue	CCW	 0.063	 (0.083)	 0.045	 (0.062)	
May-Issue	CCW	 0.110	 (0.096)	 0.118	 (0.073)	
All	Suicide	 		 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.037	 (0.023)	 -0.016	 (0.011)	
Background	Check	 0.066	 (0.029)**	 0.012	 (0.017)	
Handgun	Permit	 -0.167	 (0.070)**	 -0.092	 (0.036)**	
Shall-Issue	CCW	 0.044	 (0.040)	 0.013	 (0.026)	
May-Issue	CCW	 0.025	 (0.046)	 0.014	 (0.026)	
Gun	Suicide	 		 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.083	 (0.031)***	 -0.066	 (0.019)***	
Background	Check	 0.064	 (0.034)*	 0.015	 (0.023)	
Handgun	Permit	 -0.196	 (0.078)**	 -0.101	 (0.037)***	
Shall-Issue	CCW	 0.007	 (0.048)	 0.008	 (0.031)	
May-Issue	CCW	 -0.029	 (0.063)	 -0.012	 (0.039)	
Non-Gun	Suicide	 		 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.021	 (0.047)	 -0.001	 (0.030)	
Background	Check	 0.119	 (0.050)**	 0.062	 (0.030)**	
Handgun	Permit	 -0.156	 (0.062)**	 -0.059	 (0.040)	
Shall-Issue	CCW	 0.176	 (0.049)***	 0.085	 (0.028)***	
May-Issue	CCW	 0.152	 (0.054)***	 0.093	 (0.027)***	
*	p	<	.10,	**	p	<	.05,	***	p	<	.01	
	
	
	
Table S6. 
Alternative specifications for the effect of handgun waiting periods and background checks on 
violence from 1970–2014. Coefficients in Panel A estimate the effect of waiting periods and 
background checks on the number of deaths per 100,000 adult residents. Coefficients in Panel B 
are based on a Poisson model for the count of deaths using adult population as the exposure 
variable. All models include state and year fixed effects and mirror those of table 1. Model 3 
uses fewer years of data due to missing control variables in earlier years. The analysis covering 
1970-2014 includes 2,295 state-years; the analysis with control variables covering 1977-2014 
includes 1,938 state-years. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. 
 
A. Linear Rate 
	 1970–2014	 1977–2014	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
All	Homicide	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Waiting	Period	 -1.372	(0.772)*	 -1.332	(0.790)*	 -1.138	(0.477)**	
Background	Check	 		 -0.190	(1.046)	 -0.412	(0.960)	
Gun	Homicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -1.185	(0.627)*	 -1.054	(0.686)	 -1.010	(0.412)**	
Background	Check	 		 -0.627	(0.806)	 -0.398	(0.791)	
Non-Gun	Homicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.187	(0.186)	 -0.278	(0.191)	 -0.129	(0.131)	
Background	Check	 		 0.436	(0.324)	 -0.014	(0.219)	
All	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.906	(0.325)***	 -1.238	(0.391)***	 -0.459	(0.167)***	
Background	Check	 		 1.600	(1.157)	 0.070	(0.328)	
Gun	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.882	(0.277)***	 -0.912	(0.327)***	 -0.533	(0.203)**	
Background	Check	 		 0.143	(0.669)	 -0.453	(0.338)	
Non-Gun	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.024	(0.222)	 -0.326	(0.357)	 0.073	(0.174)	
Background	Check	 		 1.458	(0.615)**	 0.524	(0.189)***	
*	p	<	.10,	**	p	<	.05,	***	p	<	.01	
B. Poisson	
	 1970–2014	 1977–2014	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
All	Homicide	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Waiting	Period	 -0.153	(0.049)***	 -0.155	(0.050)***	 -0.125	(0.051)**	
Background	Check	 		 0.007	(0.076)	 -0.002	(0.084)	
Gun	Homicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.209	(0.064)***	 -0.198	(0.072)***	 -0.177	(0.074)**	
Background	Check	 		 -0.039	(0.094)	 -0.007	(0.112)	
Non-Gun	Homicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.031	(0.046)	 -0.060	(0.050)	 -0.012	(0.036)	
Background	Check	 		 0.100	(0.072)	 0.001	(0.055)	
All	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.047	(0.019)**	 -0.076	(0.023)***	 -0.032	(0.010)***	
Background	Check	 		 0.127	(0.070)*	 0.032	(0.021)	
Gun	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.089	(0.026)***	 -0.116	(0.030)***	 -0.075	(0.017)***	
Background	Check	 		 0.111	(0.075)	 0.032	(0.030)	
Non-Gun	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.010	(0.031)	 -0.053	(0.053)	 0.001	(0.032)	
Background	Check	 		 0.207	(0.078)***	 0.088	(0.031)***	
*	p	<	.10,	**	p	<	.05,	***	p	<	.01	
	
Table S7. 
Unweighted estimates of the effects of handgun waiting periods and background checks on 
violence. Panel A mirrors table 1 and Panel B mirrors table 2, but models are not population-
weighted. 
 
A. Full Sample Period 
	 1970–2014	 1977–2014	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
All	Homicide	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Waiting	Period	 -0.007	(0.050)	 -0.012	(0.052)	 -0.047	(0.051)	
Background	Check	 		 0.018	(0.047)	 0.022	(0.050)	
Gun	Homicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.042	(0.060)	 -0.029	(0.066)	 -0.067	(0.066)	
Background	Check	 		 -0.049	(0.068)	 0.011	(0.068)	
Non-Gun	Homicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 0.055	(0.049)	 0.020	(0.053)	 -0.003	(0.044)	
Background	Check	 		 0.134	(0.049)***	 0.039	(0.047)	
All	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.020	(0.017)	 -0.045	(0.017)**	 -0.028	(0.012)**	
Background	Check	 		 0.097	(0.029)***	 0.032	(0.018)*	
Gun	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.044	(0.023)*	 -0.070	(0.021)***	 -0.063	(0.018)***	
Background	Check	 		 0.098	(0.032)***	 0.051	(0.023)**	
Non-Gun	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.016	(0.034)	 -0.064	(0.041)	 -0.029	(0.029)	
Background	Check	 		 0.186	(0.044)***	 0.087	(0.032)***	
*	p	<	.10,	**	p	<	.05,	***	p	<	.01	
B. Brady Period 
	 Brady	Period,	1990-1998	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
All	Homicide	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Waiting	Period	 -0.047	(0.033)	 -0.048	(0.035)	 -0.012	(0.040)	
Background	Check	 		 0.003	(0.035)	 -0.019	(0.043)	
Gun	Homicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.081	(0.044)*	 -0.070	(0.048)	 -0.015	(0.051)	
Background	Check	 		 -0.032	(0.053)	 -0.045	(0.065)	
Non-Gun	Homicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 0.005	(0.034)	 -0.006	(0.039)	 0.009	(0.039)	
Background	Check	 		 0.033	(0.037)	 -0.012	(0.038)	
All	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 0.018	(0.016)	 0.023	(0.017)	 0.008	(0.017)	
Background	Check	 		 -0.014	(0.022)	 0.000	(0.014)	
Gun	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 -0.019	(0.019)	 -0.019	(0.023)	 -0.010	(0.019)	
Background	Check	 		 -0.000	(0.026)	 -0.017	(0.017)	
Non-Gun	Suicide	 		 		 		
Waiting	Period	 0.040	(0.019)**	 0.035	(0.020)*	 0.015	(0.022)	
Background	Check	 		 0.013	(0.024)	 0.036	(0.023)	
*	p	<	.10,	**	p	<	.05,	***	p	<	.01	
	
	
	
Table S8. 
Effects of handgun waiting periods on violence, 1970–2014. This table reports coefficients for 
all variables included in model 3 of table 1. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
adult deaths (21+) per 100,000 adult residents. The observation count for gun homicides is two 
less than the full sample count because North Dakota had no adult gun homicides in 2008 and 
Vermont had no adult gun homicides in 2009. The observation count for non-gun homicides is 
one less than the full sample count because North Dakota had no adult non-gun homicides in 
2003. All models include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
by state. 
	
	 Homicides	 Suicides	
	 All	 Gun	 Non-Gun	 All	 Gun	 Non-Gun	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Waiting	Period	 -0.132**	 -0.186**	 -0.035	 -0.024**	 -0.074***	 -0.006	
	 (0.050)	 (0.071)	 (0.037)	 (0.011)	 (0.017)	 (0.033)	
Background	Check	 0.025	 0.022	 0.036	 0.023	 0.029	 0.084**	
	 (0.081)	 (0.107)	 (0.057)	 (0.020)	 (0.028)	 (0.031)	
Alcohol	Consumption	 0.155**	 0.142*	 0.198***	 0.144***	 0.147***	 0.128***	
	 (0.065)	 (0.075)	 (0.071)	 (0.039)	 (0.045)	 (0.045)	
Poverty	 -0.004	 -0.006	 -0.003	 0.001	 0.002	 -0.005	
	 (0.006)	 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.004)	
Income	 -0.002	 0.003	 -0.003	 -0.009***	 -0.011**	 -0.021***	
	 (0.011)	 (0.013)	 (0.011)	 (0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	
Urban	 0.002	 0.001	 0.003	 0.003	 0.002	 0.009**	
	 (0.006)	 (0.007)	 (0.006)	 (0.003)	 (0.003)	 (0.004)	
Black	 0.035*	 0.040*	 0.022	 0.004	 0.024*	 -0.011	
	 (0.020)	 (0.023)	 (0.016)	 (0.009)	 (0.012)	 (0.010)	
Age	Under	14	 0.033	 0.057	 0.005	 -0.003	 0.002	 0.013	
	 (0.038)	 (0.055)	 (0.027)	 (0.015)	 (0.017)	 (0.021)	
Age	15	to	17	 -0.136**	 -0.106	 -0.145*	 -0.084**	 -0.171***	 -0.068	
	 (0.062)	 (0.077)	 (0.073)	 (0.035)	 (0.040)	 (0.052)	
Age	18	to	24	 0.015	 0.017	 0.014	 0.002	 0.037*	 0.010	
	 (0.046)	 (0.061)	 (0.047)	 (0.020)	 (0.021)	 (0.025)	
Age	25	to	34	 -0.035	 -0.038	 -0.015	 0.016	 0.013	 0.041	
	 (0.034)	 (0.045)	 (0.029)	 (0.019)	 (0.022)	 (0.026)	
Age	35	to	44	 -0.008	 -0.038	 0.044	 -0.009	 0.005	 0.024	
	 (0.051)	 (0.063)	 (0.047)	 (0.017)	 (0.023)	 (0.023)	
Age	45	to	54	 0.056	 0.107**	 0.009	 0.037**	 0.027	 0.016	
	 (0.034)	 (0.046)	 (0.029)	 (0.016)	 (0.020)	 (0.028)	
Age	55	to	64	 0.029	 -0.025	 0.126***	 0.020	 0.022	 0.090**	
	 (0.061)	 (0.085)	 (0.044)	 (0.022)	 (0.033)	 (0.036)	
Observations	 1,938	 1,936	 1,937	 1,938	 1,938	 1,938	
Adjusted	R2	 0.91	 0.90	 0.85	 0.92	 0.97	 0.84	
*	p	<	.10,	**	p	<	.05,	***	p	<	.01	
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